Britain’s High Streets: Crime May Be Down, But the Decline Is Real Enough

For years, every government has told us that crime is falling — and technically, they’re right. The long-term trend from the mid-1990s shows a sharp drop in violent crime, burglary and car theft. The once-dreaded high-crime Britain of the early Blair era is, statistically, a safer place.

And yet, millions of people walk through Britain’s town centres and feel something else entirely: a creeping sense that the place has gone to pot. They see shuttered shops, tent encampments outside empty Debenhams, security guards patrolling the toiletries aisle, and groups of people clearly struggling with addiction or homelessness. The official line says things have improved. Reality — or at least what feels like reality — often says otherwise.

This divide between crime rates and the experience of disorder is now at the centre of a political storm. Ministers call it “perception.” Critics call it “gaslighting.” But a closer look at the data suggests something more nuanced: people aren’t imagining it. Certain forms of disorder really have worsened — significantly. Just not always the ones politicians want to talk about.

Homelessness: the return of what we thought we’d solved

Rough sleeping fell sharply in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But since 2010, it has surged again. Academic and parliamentary briefings show rough sleeping in England has risen by over 160% compared with 2010, only just below its recent peak. The tents, makeshift bedding and visible destitution that now line many urban centres are not nostalgia or “feelings” — they are a documented reversal of earlier progress.

For a public that lived through the more orderly town centres of the 2000s, the contrast is stark. No wonder people feel their high streets are fraying.

Begging and street disorder: political football, practical problem

Begging itself is difficult to measure, but rough sleeping and begging correlate tightly. The historic clampdowns of the 1990s (backed by the old Vagrancy Act) removed much of it from view. Today’s more humane — and more stretched — approach often means far greater visibility of extreme poverty on the streets.

Politicians routinely turn begging into a moral debate. But for ordinary people walking through town, it registers simply as evidence of decline.

Shoplifting: the numbers the government cannot spin

If there’s one area where the public’s instincts are undeniably correct, it’s retail crime.

Police-recorded shoplifting has soared to two-decade highs, rising from around 340,000 offences in 2023 to well over 500,000 by early 2025. Retailers say the real figure is closer to 20 million thefts a year, with a surge in violence and abuse against staff.

This isn’t “media hype.”
This is what drives the locked cabinets, the body-worn cameras, the behind-plastic-cheese aisles that make British shops feel like airport duty-free in a collapsing republic.

Ordinary people see this — and understandably conclude that something is seriously wrong.

Antisocial behaviour: the perception gap that isn’t entirely imaginary

ASB is notoriously subjective. Teenagers hanging around were considered normal in 1998; by 2008 they were rebranded “antisocial”; by 2025 they are a political storyline. But while overall ASB is difficult to trend cleanly, the label itself has grown so powerful that nuisance behaviour now feels like part of a wider breakdown.

Academic studies consistently show a gap between actual crime and fear of disorder — but they also show that visible signs of decay (graffiti, litter, street drinking, rough sleeping) strongly drive fear of crime. Britain now has more of those visible signs than at many points during the 2000s.

So is Britain safer or more disorderly? Uncomfortably, it’s both

The long-term crime drop is real.
But so is the rise in the forms of disorder that ordinary people actually encounter on the high street.

For most people, the issue isn’t whether homicide is down 40% or whether burglary is half the 1995 rate. What they see is:

More homelessness

More street addiction

More visible mental health crises

More retail theft and security theatre

More shuttered units and depleted town centres

It’s no surprise they conclude that “the country is going to the dogs.”
And, in the specific context of British town centres, they have a point.

The political mistake: blaming the wrong things

This is where the political rhetoric falters. Instead of addressing structural causes — housing scarcity, addiction services, mental health funding, local authority collapse, retail decline, and organised shoplifting — it is easier for politicians to shout about:

“Woke councils”

“Soft policing”

“Migrant beggars”

“Youth disorder”

Those make good headlines, but they don’t solve the underlying problems.
We’ve already seen what works:

Housing First programmes cut rough sleeping dramatically in the 1990s and again temporarily during COVID.

Neighbourhood policing reduces fear of crime and improves order, but requires investment.

Addiction and mental health services reduce the cycle of visible disorder that dominates town centres.

Retail crime partnerships (police + shops + councils) have shown measurable effects where properly funded.

None of these are new ideas. They’re just the ones that work.

If Britain wants safer, cleaner town centres, it has to stop performing politics and start solving problems

The irony is that the public’s perception is dismissed as “panic,” yet it tracks closely with the areas where the data genuinely show deterioration. People can sense when a place is fraying long before ministers admit it.

The challenge now is political courage:
to acknowledge that the high street disorder people see is real, but the causes are deeper than the headlines suggest.

Blaming the wrong targets is easy.
Fixing the right problems is hard — but it’s been done before, and it can be done again.

Cheltenham–Gloucester: why our “big idea” is still too small

Gloucestershire is edging toward a “Mass Rapid Transit” (MRT) bus corridor between Cheltenham and Gloucester. It is… something. But for two urban areas that should act as a genuine counterweight to Bristol and Birmingham, an express bus is not the transformative step our county needs. The corridor deserves an integrated, rail-anchored, transit-oriented plan that unlocks housing at scale, stitches the centres together, and builds a platform for future industries rather than simply speeding today’s commute. The prize is more jobs, higher productivity and a step-change in place quality. The risk of doing the minimum is more of the same.

On 29 October, county leaders proposed just £1.25 million to progress MRT design work — modest money for a modest concept.

A vision that matches the geography

Cheltenham and Gloucester already function as a single labour market divided by the M5 and decades of piecemeal transport thinking. Official strategies admit rail connectivity is central to prosperity, yet we continue to default to buses on congested roads.

A credible alternative is on the table:

Re-activate the former rail alignment and run tram-train services centre-to-centre, interworking with the national network. This is not science fiction; the UK has already proved the tram-train model technically and operationally (Sheffield–Rotherham), along with the institutional lessons about standards, power, and signalling.

Add a station at Staverton (Gloucestershire Airport) and repurpose most of the airfield into a 20,000-home transit-oriented district, keeping a compact apron as a VTOL hub feeding BHX, BRS and LHR as advanced air mobility scales up. The county is already exploring new futures for the airport; the question is whether we aim high enough.

This is how you build a real counterweight: by hard-wiring people, jobs, education and culture together with rail, and by placing a major new community on that spine rather than scattering estates around rural junctions.

What the evidence says about rail-anchored growth

We don’t need to guess at the economic upside of modern light rail and tram-train. Multiple UK evaluations point the same way:

Light rail stimulates city economies and investment. The Knowles & Ferbrache synthesis for UKTram found consistent links to business location, private development, labour-market access and image effects across UK systems.

Manchester Metrolink has repeatedly been associated with improved access to jobs, education and healthcare and with development around stops; the “transformative impacts” literature used Metrolink as a UK case.

Nottingham NET Phase Two supported around 1,600 direct construction jobs at peak, with documented local skills and supply-chain programmes, an approach local authorities are urged to copy because it converts construction spend into local employment and capability.

Rail investment uplifts land value and drives new homes. Crossrail’s pre-opening studies estimated £20.1 bn of additional residential value and up to 180,000 homes in the pipeline; a separate assessment found a ~2.2% house-price uplift near stations over 2008–2019. While our scheme is smaller, the direction of travel is clear: high-quality rail capacity attracts development and raises values that can be recycled through land-value capture.

The Department for Transport’s own cross-case evaluation confirms rail can produce measurable productivity and employment impacts where it is integrated with local plans  and laments the shortage of robust ex-post evaluation only because too many schemes were not designed to capture the benefits properly. We should learn from that and design for measurement and value capture from day one.

Why buses alone won’t do it

Bus Rapid Transit can be great for specific corridors, but it rarely generates the same permanence signal to investors. That “steel in the ground” matters: developers and institutions bank on fixed rail. Academic reviews consistently show light rail’s place-making effects, the image, certainty and clustering that pull in private capital, outpacing bus-only schemes when cities are competing for talent and firms.

Housing at scale — on the transit spine, not on the bypass

Gloucestershire needs homes and good ones. Industry-standard multipliers suggest each new dwelling supports ~2.4–3.4 total jobs (direct, indirect, induced) during build-out, varying by product mix. On 20,000 homes, that’s on the order of 48,000–68,000 job-years over the programme, plus ongoing local services employment once occupied. Pair that with a rail station at the heart of the district and you have a liveable, low-carbon growth pole rather than a traffic problem.

Internationally, airport-to-urban conversions often anchor research, advanced manufacturing and housing (cf. Berlin Tegel’s “Urban Tech Republic”, though Berlin’s slow delivery is a warning to govern and finance these projects competently). The UK government has even commissioned frameworks for understanding airport-economy links, useful both for strengthening the VTOL hub business case and for judging alternatives to conventional aviation land-use.

A realistic take on risks (and how to manage them)

Costs and delivery: The Sheffield tram-train pilot suffered a notorious cost overrun; we should treat that as a lesson in governance and standards, not a veto on the model. Package the scheme with clear risk-allocation, early utilities coordination, and a funding stack that blends local land-value capture with central grants.

Planning and capacity: The national planning system is short of case officers; phasing and a dedicated delivery vehicle will be essential to avoid the bottlenecks now stalling UK housing output.

Airport transition: If we retain a compact apron for VTOL and training while releasing most land for housing, we must evidence net economic gain versus status-quo aviation. The DfT local airport-economy framework gives us the methodology.

What success looks like (and what it’s worth)

In practical terms, a Cheltenham–Gloucester tram-train with a Staverton station + 20,000-home TOD could deliver:

Construction employment: ~48k–68k job-years over build-out, with targeted apprenticeships and local procurement (copy NET’s model).

Productivity uplift: accelerated access to GCHQ/Cyber Park, the hospitals, colleges and major employers, the same access-to-opportunity effects documented for Metrolink and other UK light-rail systems.

Land-value and fiscal gains: material property-value uplift near stations and a pipeline of private development that can be hypothecated to repay core infrastructure (Crossrail provides the clearest UK precedent for value capture at scale).

Place quality and investment narrative: light rail’s durable “place-signal” is repeatedly cited as a factor in attracting employers and investment,  the sort of intangible that becomes very tangible in site decisions.

The choice in front of us

Cheltenham grew just 2.7% between 2011 and 2021; Gloucester grew 8.9%. Together they could , and should, behave like a single mid-sized city with the heft to keep graduates, attract firms and share prosperity more evenly. Doing that with a bus lane is unlikely. Doing it with rail-anchored transit and a new urban district at Staverton is bold, evidence-led and financeable if we capture the uplift we create.

Gloucestershire has been talking about growth for a decade. The strategic plans say connectivity drives prosperity. It’s time to believe our own strategies, and to act accordingly.

Notes: Key sources include UKTram/academic evaluations of light rail impacts; DfT case studies on rail investment; Crossrail value-uplift studies; HBF employment multipliers for housing; Nottingham NET and Metrolink evidence; Gloucestershire strategies; and current reporting on the MRT proposal and Gloucestershire Airport’s future.

High Street Rental Auctions: what the new powers mean — and why Gloucester’s heritage makes the stakes higher

The UK’s High Street Rental Auctions (HSRAs) are now live across England. Enabled by Part 10 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 and commenced on 2 December 2024, they give local authorities a discretionary power to force the letting—by auction—of qualifying, long-vacant high-street premises on short leases (typically 1–5 years). Central government’s non-statutory guidance, updated in June 2025, sets out the mechanics from notices to template leases and auction packs.

How it works (in plain English)

If a property on a designated high street or in a town centre has been vacant for at least 366 days within the previous 24 months, a council may serve notices and run an auction for a short tenancy. The owner does not have a veto (nor do superior landlords or mortgagees), though there are opportunities to engage, propose a tenancy, or challenge via counter-notice on defined grounds. The aim is to get inert space back into productive, public-facing use (retail, services, leisure, community, culture).

The government has issued a full suite of forms (initial/final letting notices, counter-notice) and model tenancy documents to standardise the process. A June 2025 update also recommends entering a Land Registry restriction at notice stage so incoming parties can see an auction is in train.

What it means for landlords

For responsive, actively-marketing owners, the immediate message is “work with your council, or the council may step in.” The regime can compress voids but reduces control over tenant selection, lease terms and timing. Industry commentary has warned of lender concerns, residual liabilities, and the risk that low-rent short lets could reset local comparables—though the counter-argument is that activation beats blight.

Two important guard-rails temper the power:

It’s discretionary: councils choose when to use it and must follow the statutory tests and guidance.

It doesn’t trump other consents: planning permission (where needed) and Listed Building Consent still bite; the auction lease cannot authorise unlawful works.

What it means for places

Academic and policy literature on high streets consistently links persistent vacancy with lower footfall, safety perceptions and investment confidence. HSRAs are a behavioural nudge with teeth: they create a default path to occupation when negotiation stalls. Government frames them as part of a place-activation toolkit rather than a full market fix (they don’t address business rates, online competition or structural catchments).

The controversies

Critics—particularly landlord bodies—argue HSRAs erode property rights, risk mis-matching tenants to buildings, and socialise costs (e.g., compliance, basic fit-out) onto owners for limited upside on short terms. Proponents counter that auctions are targeted at long-term vacancies and include procedural safeguards, while the broader public interest in re-animating centres justifies intervention.

There’s also a live debate about quality: will short leases encourage low-capex, pop-up uses that churn, or can councils curate resilient, community-anchoring occupiers? Practice will vary by place and by how assertively councils use pre-auction engagement and conditions.

Applying it to Gloucester: a city rich in listed fabric

Gloucester is unusually heritage-dense: ~680–700 listed buildings, 14 conservation areas, and a nationally significant docks and medieval street pattern. That richness is an asset—and a constraint.

In that context, HSRAs could help re-fill stubborn voids along the Gate Streets and routes into the Docks, with likely targets being small and medium retail frontages where vacancy drags on the public realm. Politically, Gloucester has recently mooted adopting and using HSRA powers, signalling a willingness to deploy them where voluntary routes fail.

But the heritage overlay matters:

Listed Building Consent still applies. Any works affecting character—shopfront changes, signage, internal fabric alterations—require consent regardless of an auction outcome. Early dialogue with the City Conservation Officer and use of model shopfront guidance will be essential to avoid delay or enforcement.

Fit-out economics are tighter in listed stock. Short leases may not support deep retrofits (M&E, accessibility, thermal upgrades). Councils may need to shape auction packs with realistic works scopes, staged licences for alterations, and signpost grant/heritage funding where available.

Curation over churn. Given Gloucester’s concentrated heritage streetscapes, the city will benefit most if auctions prioritise public-facing, spill-out and cultural uses that animate frontages without heavy interventions.

A pragmatic read-out for Gloucester

Used sparingly and well, HSRAs could be a useful backstop: they shift bargaining power on a handful of long-term empties, restore overlooked frontages, and send a clear signal that vacancy has a cost. But success will hinge on heritage-literate execution—tight auction packs, early conservation input, and realistic lease terms that reflect the additional time and cost of working in listed buildings.

For landlords of Gloucester’s historic properties, the takeaway is simple: re-engage early (before notices land), assemble your heritage and building-regulations strategy, and be ready to propose a credible letting that beats the auction. For the council, transparently linking HSRAs to a wider place strategy (public realm, wayfinding, rates relief lobbying, and active travel to boost footfall) will help ensure auctions are a means, not the end.

Sources & further reading:

Government guidance and templates (updated June 2025); the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 (Part 10); Parliamentary Library briefing (Feb 2025); and sector analyses from Dentons, TLT and others on lender/landlord implications. Gloucester heritage context from Historic England and City Council materials.

High Street Rental Auctions: what the new powers mean — and why Gloucester’s heritage makes the stakes higher

The UK’s High Street Rental Auctions (HSRAs) are now live across England. Enabled by Part 10 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 and commenced on 2 December 2024, they give local authorities a discretionary power to force the letting—by auction—of qualifying, long-vacant high-street premises on short leases (typically 1–5 years). Central government’s non-statutory guidance, updated in June 2025, sets out the mechanics from notices to template leases and auction packs.

How it works (in plain English)

If a property on a designated high street or in a town centre has been vacant for at least 366 days within the previous 24 months, a council may serve notices and run an auction for a short tenancy. The owner does not have a veto (nor do superior landlords or mortgagees), though there are opportunities to engage, propose a tenancy, or challenge via counter-notice on defined grounds. The aim is to get inert space back into productive, public-facing use (retail, services, leisure, community, culture).

The government has issued a full suite of forms (initial/final letting notices, counter-notice) and model tenancy documents to standardise the process. A June 2025 update also recommends entering a Land Registry restriction at notice stage so incoming parties can see an auction is in train.

What it means for landlords

For responsive, actively-marketing owners, the immediate message is “work with your council, or the council may step in.” The regime can compress voids but reduces control over tenant selection, lease terms and timing. Industry commentary has warned of lender concerns, residual liabilities, and the risk that low-rent short lets could reset local comparables—though the counter-argument is that activation beats blight.

Two important guard-rails temper the power:

It’s discretionary: councils choose when to use it and must follow the statutory tests and guidance.

It doesn’t trump other consents: planning permission (where needed) and Listed Building Consent still bite; the auction lease cannot authorise unlawful works.

What it means for places

Academic and policy literature on high streets consistently links persistent vacancy with lower footfall, safety perceptions and investment confidence. HSRAs are a behavioural nudge with teeth: they create a default path to occupation when negotiation stalls. Government frames them as part of a place-activation toolkit rather than a full market fix (they don’t address business rates, online competition or structural catchments).

The Controversies

Critics—particularly landlord bodies—argue HSRAs erode property rights, risk mis-matching tenants to buildings, and socialise costs (e.g., compliance, basic fit-out) onto owners for limited upside on short terms. Proponents counter that auctions are targeted at long-term vacancies and include procedural safeguards, while the broader public interest in re-animating centres justifies intervention.

There’s also a live debate about quality: will short leases encourage low-capex, pop-up uses that churn, or can councils curate resilient, community-anchoring occupiers? Practice will vary by place and by how assertively councils use pre-auction engagement and conditions.

Applying it to Gloucester: a city rich in listed fabric

Gloucester is unusually heritage-dense: ~680–700 listed buildings, 14 conservation areas, and a nationally significant docks and medieval street pattern. That richness is an asset—and a constraint.

In that context, HSRAs could help re-fill stubborn voids along the Gate Streets and routes into the Docks, with likely targets being small and medium retail frontages where vacancy drags on the public realm. Politically, Gloucester has recently mooted adopting and using HSRA powers, signalling a willingness to deploy them where voluntary routes fail.

But the heritage overlay matters:

Listed Building Consent still applies. Any works affecting character—shopfront changes, signage, internal fabric alterations—require consent regardless of an auction outcome. Early dialogue with the City Conservation Officer and use of model shopfront guidance will be essential to avoid delay or enforcement.

Fit-out economics are tighter in listed stock. Short leases may not support deep retrofits (M&E, accessibility, thermal upgrades). Councils may need to shape auction packs with realistic works scopes, staged licences for alterations, and signpost grant/heritage funding where available.

Curation over churn. Given Gloucester’s concentrated heritage streetscapes, the city will benefit most if auctions prioritise public-facing, spill-out and cultural uses that animate frontages without heavy interventions.

A pragmatic read-out for Gloucester

Used sparingly and well, HSRAs could be a useful backstop: they shift bargaining power on a handful of long-term empties, restore overlooked frontages, and send a clear signal that vacancy has a cost. But success will hinge on heritage-literate execution—tight auction packs, early conservation input, and realistic lease terms that reflect the additional time and cost of working in listed buildings.

For landlords of Gloucester’s historic properties, the takeaway is simple: re-engage early (before notices land), assemble your heritage and building-regulations strategy, and be ready to propose a credible letting that beats the auction. For the council, transparently linking HSRAs to a wider place strategy (public realm, wayfinding, rates relief lobbying, and active travel to boost footfall) will help ensure auctions are a means, not the end.


Sources & further reading: Government guidance and templates (updated June 2025); the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 (Part 10); Parliamentary Library briefing (Feb 2025); and sector analyses from Dentons, TLT and others on lender/landlord implications. Gloucester heritage context from Historic England and City Council materials.

Sustainable Urban Regeneration: Balancing Growth and Community in the Face of Gentrification

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As urban centres across the UK and globally grapple with the pressures of economic growth, population change, and post-pandemic recovery, urban regeneration has emerged as a critical tool for revitalizing neglected areas. However, with regeneration often comes the looming spectre of gentrification—a process that can displace long-standing communities and erode the very cultural fabric that makes a place unique. Striking a balance between sustainable growth and the preservation of community identity is not just a challenge but a necessity for planners, local authorities, and developers.

The Double-Edged Sword of Gentrification

Gentrification, often defined as the transformation of an area through an influx of higher-income residents, can lead to improved infrastructure, increased property values, and economic rejuvenation. However, the downside is clear: as property prices rise, existing lower-income residents may find themselves priced out of the areas they’ve lived in for decades. This displacement can fracture communities, displace small businesses, and lead to a loss of local character.

Studies such as those by Lees, Slater, and Wyly (2008) suggest that gentrification often disproportionately affects marginalized groups, exacerbating social inequalities. Yet, regeneration without gentrification remains possible, provided that careful planning and inclusive strategies are implemented.

Community-Centric Regeneration: Learning from Success Stories

The challenge for urban planners and local authorities lies in developing regeneration schemes that improve the area for all its residents, not just new ones. In this context, inclusive regeneration models, which focus on both physical improvements and social sustainability, are emerging as a way to address gentrification.

One such model is the concept of Community Land Trusts (CLTs). CLTs provide a mechanism for ensuring that land remains under the control of the community, preventing the wholesale displacement of existing residents. A study by Davis (2010) found that in areas where CLTs were implemented, not only did housing remain affordable, but the communities also reported higher levels of civic engagement and satisfaction. Cities like Liverpool and Bristol have already successfully used CLTs to protect housing affordability while enabling regeneration.

Another approach is socially responsible development, where local authorities engage in genuine, bottom-up consultation with communities before breaking ground on projects. The success of the Glasgow Canal Regeneration Project is often cited as a case where community engagement helped shape development, ensuring that existing residents remained at the heart of decision-making. The result? A regenerated area where new businesses and residents coexist with long-standing communities, enhancing the local economy without displacing those who had contributed to the area’s identity for years.

Sustainability as the Core of Regeneration

Sustainability is not only about green buildings or eco-friendly public spaces; it’s about creating environments that support long-term social cohesion and economic inclusivity. Local authorities must adopt a holistic approach to regeneration that addresses housing, local jobs, cultural infrastructure, and green spaces, all while safeguarding affordability and accessibility.

“True regeneration should be based on a principle of social justice,” as urbanist Jane Jacobs famously noted. Her work underscores the importance of maintaining diverse, vibrant communities rather than focusing solely on physical renewal. Sustainable regeneration initiatives, like the one seen in the Elephant and Castle redevelopment in London, which implemented affordable housing schemes alongside new development, provide a framework for balancing growth and community needs.

The Role of Local Authorities and Developers: Collaboration is Key

For local authorities and developers, the goal should not be to prevent change but to manage it in ways that protect community interests. Here are key strategies that can help mitigate the negative effects of gentrification:

  1. Inclusive Housing Policies: Ensure a proportion of new developments include affordable housing to cater to low- and middle-income families. Policies such as “inclusionary zoning” can mandate that a percentage of new units remain below market rate. Research by the London School of Economics (2016) indicates that such policies help maintain a socio-economic mix in regenerated areas.
  2. Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs): Developers can enter into CBAs with local authorities, promising to deliver certain community benefits, such as local job creation, affordable retail spaces, or community centres. In New York, the redevelopment of the Atlantic Yards included a CBA that ensured the development provided direct benefits to residents, including affordable housing and job training programs.
  3. Participatory Planning: Engage with residents early and often to ensure their voices are heard in the planning process. According to a report by the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), community participation can lead to better project outcomes, higher local support, and more socially sustainable results.

A Call to Action: Expertise in Action

The challenges of urban regeneration, particularly in balancing growth and community preservation, are significant but not insurmountable. Through careful planning, collaboration, and a commitment to social equity, local authorities and developers can deliver projects that benefit all stakeholders—old and new.

At this crucial moment in urban development, it’s imperative that cities across the UK and beyond adopt forward-thinking, inclusive, and sustainable regeneration strategies. By leveraging my expertise in placemaking, urban regeneration, and community engagement, I am equipped to help organizations navigate these challenges. Whether you’re a local authority seeking to develop a long-term regeneration plan or a developer aiming to create sustainable communities, I can provide actionable insights and strategies to ensure your project is both economically viable and socially responsible.

Let’s build places that work for everyone—together.

Addressing the Shortcomings of the UK City of Culture Initiative: Toward a More Inclusive and Locally-Driven Model

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Introduction

The UK City of Culture initiative, despite its noble intentions, has faced significant criticisms for failing to achieve its promised economic, social, and cultural impacts. Key shortcomings identified include the imposition of external experts, cultural imperialism driven by centralized decision-making, a focus on “quality” over community relevance, and governance structures that lack genuine local representation. Additionally, the initiative has been criticized for its lack of investment in physical cultural infrastructure, which could provide long-term benefits to local communities. This article explores these issues and suggests an alternative model that prioritizes local engagement, empowerment, and sustainable cultural development.

Issues and Shortcomings

The “Parachuting In” of External Experts:

  • One of the primary criticisms of the UK City of Culture initiative is the reliance on external “experts” who move from city to city, often bringing with them generic cultural strategies that do not align with the unique contexts of the host cities. These experts, many of whom are temporary consultants or cultural professionals, tend to impose a one-size-fits-all approach that overlooks local needs, aspirations, and talents. The issue lies in the parasitic nature of this model: these experts often extract value from local communities without contributing to the long-term development of local cultural ecosystems.
  • A more effective approach would involve genuine support for local groups, organizations, and existing infrastructure. This can be achieved by prioritizing funding for grassroots cultural initiatives and ensuring that local cultural leaders and practitioners play a central role in decision-making processes. For example, establishing a requirement that a significant percentage of cultural programming and funding is led by local organizations would help to build capacity, retain local talent, and ensure the cultural program is genuinely reflective of local identity.
  1. Cultural Imperialism by Centralized, Middle-Class “Culture Vultures”:
    • The current model of the UK City of Culture has been criticized for its top-down approach, where decision-making is often concentrated among a small group of individuals based in London or other metropolitan centers. These decision-makers, who are typically from middle-class backgrounds, may impose cultural values, themes, and agendas that do not resonate with the local population. This approach often marginalizes local voices and overlooks the rich, diverse cultural practices that exist within the community.
    • A shift towards a more localized model of cultural development would involve decentralizing the control over cultural programming and funding. Decision-making bodies should be composed primarily of local representatives, including community leaders, local artists, and cultural organizations. Additionally, funding criteria should be restructured to prioritize projects that reflect local cultural traditions, histories, and aspirations, rather than conforming to externally imposed standards of “excellence” or “innovation.”
  2. Focus on “Quality” Over Community Relevance:
    • The emphasis on so-called “quality” cultural programming often reflects a narrow, elitist understanding of culture, which may be disconnected from what local communities value or need. This focus on “quality” is frequently equated with the replication of cultural forms and practices associated with London-centric or metropolitan arts institutions. For instance, programs often prioritize contemporary art forms, such as avant-garde theatre or experimental music, over local cultural expressions that may be more meaningful to residents, such as local history, folk traditions, or community festivals.
    • To counter this cultural snobbery, the UK City of Culture initiative should adopt a broader and more inclusive definition of culture that values all forms of cultural expression, including those that are rooted in local traditions and everyday life. This could involve introducing participatory budgeting practices, where local residents are actively involved in deciding which cultural projects receive funding. By giving communities a direct voice in shaping the cultural agenda, the initiative can ensure that programming is aligned with local interests and needs.
  3. Creation of Governance Bodies That Are Not Truly Local:
    • Governance structures for the City of Culture initiative often lack true local representation, instead prioritizing individuals or organizations that meet the requirements of Arts Council England (ACE) or other national bodies. This results in governance bodies that may not have a deep understanding of the local context or a genuine commitment to local development. Additionally, these bodies may prioritize meeting the expectations of national funders over addressing the needs of the local community.
    • To address this issue, governance bodies should be reconstituted to reflect the local population genuinely. This could involve mandating that a majority of board members are drawn from local communities and ensuring diverse representation across socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic lines. Furthermore, the governance framework should be designed to be accountable to local communities, with regular public consultations and transparent reporting on decision-making processes and outcomes.
  4. Overemphasis on Issues Favored by Central Authorities:
    • The City of Culture initiative often focuses on issues favored by central authorities, such as youth engagement, race relations, or climate change, which, while important, may not be the primary concerns of local communities. This emphasis can lead to a disconnect between the cultural programming and the issues that local residents care about, such as local history, heritage, or economic development.
    • A more community-centered approach would involve conducting comprehensive local needs assessments to understand the specific issues, challenges, and opportunities within each city. Cultural programming should then be tailored to address these locally identified priorities. For example, if a community values its industrial heritage, programming could focus on preserving and celebrating that history through exhibitions, storytelling projects, and educational initiatives.
  5. Lack of Investment in Physical Cultural Infrastructure:
    • One of the most significant shortcomings of the UK City of Culture initiative is its lack of focus on investing in physical cultural infrastructure, such as museums, theatres, and cultural hubs. Arts Council England (ACE) and other funding bodies tend to prioritize funding for temporary events, exhibitions, and performances, which can provide short-term cultural engagement but do little to build lasting cultural capacity or infrastructure within cities.
    • Research indicates that investment in physical cultural infrastructure can have significant long-term benefits for local economies. A study by the Royal Society of Arts (2019) found that for every £1 invested in cultural infrastructure, there is a return of approximately £4 in local economic activity due to increased tourism, job creation, and local spending. Furthermore, physical infrastructure provides a lasting resource for local communities, supporting cultural education, engagement, and participation long after the City of Culture designation has ended.
    • However, critics argue that investment in infrastructure can be costly and may divert funds away from other cultural initiatives. Some also suggest that infrastructure projects can become “white elephants” if not well-planned or aligned with local needs, potentially leading to underused or abandoned facilities. Nonetheless, these risks can be mitigated by involving local communities in the planning and decision-making processes to ensure that new infrastructure aligns with local aspirations and has a clear, sustainable purpose.
  6. Failure to Build on Endemic Talent and Organizations:
    • The current model often overlooks or underutilizes existing local talent and cultural organizations, opting instead to import external acts or exhibitions that may not resonate with local communities. This not only undermines local cultural ecosystems but also results in a missed opportunity to cultivate and promote homegrown talent.
    • A more effective approach would involve mapping and actively supporting local cultural assets, including artists, musicians, writers, and community organizations. Funding and resources should be directed toward initiatives that promote and develop local talent, ensuring that the cultural program is not only representative of the local community but also contributes to the long-term growth of its cultural sector.
  7. Inadequate Community Engagement and Participation:
    • Many City of Culture programs fail to engage local communities meaningfully, resulting in a sense of disconnection or even resentment toward the initiative. This can be exacerbated by the use of inaccessible language, high ticket prices, or the perceived elitism of certain cultural events.
    • To foster genuine community engagement, the initiative should prioritize participatory and accessible cultural activities, such as open workshops, street festivals, or community theatre projects. Moreover, efforts should be made to remove barriers to participation, such as by offering free or low-cost entry to events and ensuring that marketing and communication materials are clear, inclusive, and representative of the local community.

Conclusion

The UK City of Culture initiative has the potential to deliver meaningful economic, social, and cultural benefits, but it must address its current shortcomings to realize this potential fully. The program’s failure to invest in physical cultural infrastructure, over-reliance on external experts, centralized decision-making, focus on “quality” over community relevance, and inadequate community engagement highlight the need for a more localized and inclusive approach. By prioritizing local engagement, decentralizing decision-making, broadening the definition of culture, creating truly representative governance structures, focusing on sustainable economic planning, supporting endemic talent, and fostering genuine community participation, the initiative can become a more inclusive and impactful model for cultural development. Moving forward, these changes will be essential to ensuring that the UK City of Culture is not only a celebration of culture but also a catalyst for meaningful and lasting change

Solutions to the decline in UK high streets and town centres

Introduction

The decline of UK high streets and town centres is a complex issue that has been a growing concern in recent years. Notwithstanding the impact of Covid the rise of online shopping, changing consumer habits, and a lack of investment in physical retail spaces have all contributed to the decline. This article will explore potential solutions to this problem, drawing on academic research and real-world examples.

Background

The high street and town centre are an important part of UK society and economy. They provide a sense of community, serve as a hub for local businesses, and generate significant economic activity. However, in recent years, the decline of these areas has become a pressing issue. According to a 2019 report by the Local Data Company, 22% of UK high street shops were vacant, up from 10% in 2010. Additionally, a 2018 report by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors found that footfall in town centres had decreased by 3% over the previous year.

One of the main drivers of this decline is the rise of online shopping. The convenience and cost-effectiveness of online retail has led to a shift in consumer habits, with more and more people choosing to shop online rather than in physical stores. Additionally, a lack of investment in physical retail spaces and a failure to adapt to changing consumer needs has further contributed to the decline of high streets and town centres.

Potential Solutions

Encouraging Online-Offline Integration
One potential solution to the decline of high streets and town centres is to encourage the integration of online and offline retail. By offering a seamless shopping experience that allows customers to purchase online and collect in-store, or browse online and purchase in-store, retailers can better meet the needs of consumers. This approach has been successful for some retailers, such as John Lewis, which has seen a significant increase in online sales after introducing click-and-collect services.

Focusing on Experiences
Another potential solution is to focus on creating a unique and engaging shopping experience that cannot be replicated online. This can be achieved by investing in physical spaces that offer a sense of community and social interaction, such as coffee shops, restaurants, and other leisure activities. Additionally, by offering a wide range of services, such as personal styling, tailoring and repair, and product customization, retailers can differentiate themselves from online competitors.

Redefining the Role of High Streets
A third potential solution is to redefine the role of high streets and town centres. Instead of focusing solely on retail, these areas could be repurposed to serve as community hubs, offering a wide range of services and activities such as housing, healthcare, and educational facilities. This approach is already being implemented in some areas, such as the redevelopment of Elephant and Castle Shopping Centre in London, which will include a mix of residential, retail, and community spaces.

Investing in Public Transport
A fourth solution is to invest in public transport infrastructure to make it easier for people to access high streets and town centres. By improving public transport links, retailers can attract more customers and increase footfall. This can be seen in the example of the redevelopment of Stratford station in London, which has led to a significant increase in footfall and economic activity in the surrounding area.

Encouraging Local Businesses
A final potential solution is to encourage the growth of local businesses. By providing support and resources for small businesses, such as training, mentoring, and access to funding, high streets and town centres can become more vibrant and diverse. This approach has been successful in some areas, such as the town of Totnes in Devon, which has a thriving community of independent retailers and a strong sense of local identity.

Exploring the Relationship Between Leadership, Organisational Structure and Place Management

Evidence and Decision Making

Evidence based decision making has been defined as a situation in which a decision was made that followed directly from the evidence.  This has been contrasted with decision-based evidence making which involves marshalling facts and their analysis in an attempt validate a decision that has already been made within an organisation (Tingling & Brydon, 2010) (Buchanan & Huczynski, 2017)

Within any organisation decisions are made at a personal, group and organisational level

At a personal-level, decisions are often influenced by the fact that memory is fallible. Understanding what is ‘real’ versus ‘perceived’ memory over time is a dilemma for all oral historians. (Britten, 2014)

At a group levels, effective group decision making is “characterized by a full use of members’ resources, an efficient use of time, and a high-quality outcome” (Coats & Thompson, 2017). Groups can demonstrate deficiencies in process or roadblocks which can hinder effectiveness of the group as a whole or elements of that group. For example, group members may withhold critical input because they do not want to interrupt another person i.e., “production blocking” which has been identified as an important cause of productivity loss in brainstorming groups (Nijstada, et al., 2003).  Group members may feel apprehensive about being evaluated by other group members, or have been interrupted by another person such as a domineering teammate, or are prone to social loafing which is “the tendency for individuals to expend less effort when working collectively than when working individually” and leads to larger groups being less efficient (Karau & Williams, 1993). Furthermore, members may ignore teammates’ input because they are unwilling to consider alternative viewpoints or because they are distracted as they closely monitor the conversational flow for opportunities to state their own ideas. Collectively, these and other barriers can cause groups to evaluate solutions before all members have provided input or exhausted their supply of ideas and suggestions. (Coats & Thompson, 2017).

Group decision-making techniques have been designed to increase effectiveness by diminishing barriers and roadblocks such as those described earlier. Five of the most commonly cited group decision-making techniques are brainstorming (Kramer, et al., 1997), the nominal group technique – where group members work independently and nonredundant ideas pooled by a moderator (Kramer, et al., 1997) the Delphi technique – using written questionnaires to eliminate the influence of personal relationships and committees being dominated by strong personalities, the stepladder technique, and TOPSIS. These techniques vary in the manner in which they structure group problem solving. They also differ according to the particular process deficiencies they aim to minimize.

Interestingly while the decision to employ groups instead of an individual for dealing with a particular problem typically stems from the belief that a solution produced by a group of individuals working together will be superior to the solution produced by an average individual there are a number of studies that indicate that usually group performance has been found to be inferior to the performance of the best individual (Burleson, et al., 1984) (Libby & K.T. & Zimmer, 1987)

The Objective and Task method

Developed initially to help determine budgets for advertising spend, especially in new markets, The “objective-and-task” method suggests to develop budgets by (1) defining objectives as specifically as possible, (2) determining the tasks that must be performed to achieve these objectives, and (3) estimating the costs of performing these tasks. The sum of these costs is the proposed budget this compares with the “arbitrary” approach where often budget would be set “by ear” first with the hope that it would cover the costs incurred by the objective. (Barnes, et al., 1982)

Forms of Governance within placemaking and the possible impacts of differing approaches to governance and organisational structure

Place management has been described as a “rather haphazard affair” (Parker, 2011). In the UK, there have been a number of neoliberal responses to rising expectations and a lack of engagement in government.  A high number of towns and cities in the UK operate under some sort of place management partnership scheme. These schemes are nearly always a partnership between the public sector and the private sector and exist to achieve economic benefits – demonstrating neoliberal practice and wider trends discussed in the literature (Zapata & Hall, 2012) (Bowden & Liddle, 2017).  The Governance of these place management organisations is often highly politicised (Ntounis, 2018) (Vuignier, 2017) and though epistemological evidence would demonstrate that local authorities working alone are limited in their capacity to influence the fortunes of their high streets and town centres (Peel & Parker, 2017) and reflect the reality which is that no single organisation is solely responsible for place making but that the “function is a complex matrix” (Peel & Lloyd, 2008) Nevertheless differing views of governance  can cause friction, particularly with local authorities which have historically seen themselves as leading on setting placemaking strategies (Peel, 2016) but are increasingly having much of the local agenda driven by other agencies such as Business Improvement Districts and similar.  Grint, suggests that only if local leaders are prepared to “ignore, avoid or subvert central diktats”, are we likely to make much progress on the leadership of place. (Grint, 2010) if this is a truism it will have ad naturam impact on perception, methodology and practice of governance

Leadership within place – organisations and individuals Power and hierarchy

Human interaction is key to the effectiveness of leadership within place and its consequential development of strategies and relationships (Ntounis, 2018). For the purpose of the following analysis it will be useful for practical purposes, at least in part, to take a teleological approach to examining the nature of the critical incident examining the structure of the narrative of the evidence looking into the actors, goals and proximal rather than distal causation. For the purpose of this examination the definition of teleology will be defined as the process of heading towards an end (Katsikis & Kyrgidou, 2009).  There will be an examination of the critical incident and leadership in relation to theories relating to leadership traits (Kirkpatrick & Lock, 1991) (Prentice, et al., 2019), behaviour of leaders, continency and situational theories examining how context influences leadership (Phaneuf, et al., 2016),  the sources of  a leaders power and influence and transformational-transactional leadership theory idealized influence i.e. charisma,  “inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration” (Phaneuf, et al., 2016)

A number of sources are cited indicating effective leaders must also ensure that organizations adapt to the external environment and use resources efficiently (Antonakis & House, 2002) (Mumford, 2006) indicating that effective organizational leadership is not just about exercising influence on an interpersonal level but depends on leader expertise and on the formulation and implementation of solutions to complex social and task-oriented problems (Mumford, 2000). The literature indicates that effective leaders must, identify strategic and tactical goals while monitoring team outcomes and the environment (Morgeson, et al., 2010). In this sense leaders are “instrumental” for organizational effectiveness. Antonakis and House (Antonakis & House, 2002) termed this type of leadership, “instrumental leadership” a form of expert-based power.

Analysis of different approaches to place management and leadership

“A large variety of research work indicates there is consensus that entrepreneurship is a vital element of social, organizational and individual success” (Katsikis & Kyrgidou, 2009) (Antoncic & Hisrich, 2003) (Davidsson, 2005)

The last two decades have seen a major shift in the leadership paradigm and this has been widely discussed across the mainstream leadership literature (Cullen and Yammarino 2014; Fitzsimons et al., 2011; Harris, 2008 Martin et al., 2015; Spillane, 2006). Cullen and Yammarino (2014, p.1) have seen the above transition from an orthodox and ‘heroic’ leadership towards collective forms of leadership as “a paradigm shift” within the field of leadership. Such paradigm shift in the field of leadership is one that recognises that “teams, organizations, coalitions, communities, networks, systems, and other collectives carry out leadership functions through a collective social process” (Cullen and Yammarino, 2014, p. 1)

Peter Tingling and Michael Brydon (2010) describe evidence-based decision making as a situation in which a decision was made that followed directly from the evidence They contrasted it with decision-based evidence making which involved marshalling facts and analysis to support a decision that had already been made elsewhere in the organization. They found that managers, when making a decision, used evidence in three different ways: Tingling and Brydon (2010) p.73 MIT Sloan Management review/Massachusetts Institute of Technology

In other instances, social pressure within the group may lead to conformity behaviors, which in turn tend to favor acceptance and silence-disagreement (Maier, 1967). Janis (1982) found that cohesive groups often have more concerns for unanimity than they do for evaluating different courses of action.

Critical Incident Technique (CIT) analysis

Critical Incident Technique (CIT) analysis was initially developed during the second world war by the US Army Air Force to help choose and categorise air crews and utilised the methodology described by one of its developers J.C Flanagan in 1954 (Flanagan, 1954) but has subsequently found much wider use (Holloway & Schwartz, 2014) forming the basis of a widely used research method (Cooper & Cary, 1991) (Britten, 2014) becoming an investigative instrument enabling researchers to analyse critical incidents based on qualitative evidence and study the perception of effects of problems on workgroups. As described by Flanagan and elsewhere in the literature CIT can be used to examine successes and failures of individuals or organizations in specific situations, reviewing the efficacy of action or inaction, studying factors beneficial and detrimental, the collation of functional or behavioural descriptions of events or problems, or determining characteristics that are critical to important aspects of an activity or event (Butterfield, 2005) (Flanagan, 1954)

The methodology for CIT research as outlined by Flanagan (Flanagan, 1954) included 5 parts which included firstly determining the general aims of the activity being studied for example the topic of this paper – analysing what CIT analysis can bring to an understanding of governance, leadership, organisational structure  and place management.   Flanagan emphasised that there should be flexibility particularly for the method of data collection (Flanagan, 1954).  Generally, CIT represents a set of procedures for systematically identifying behaviours that contribute to the success or failure of individuals or organizations in specific situation. In 2009, Butterfield et al. added nine steps for the purposes of assessing the credibility of the outcomes of CIT (Butterfield, et al., 2009). These new additions have become known as the Enhanced Critical Incident Technique (ECIT). Subsequent literature has examined and postulated different methodologies  (Britten, 2014) (Butterfield, 2005). 

UK City of Culture – does the hype live up to reality?

Following on from the perceived and touted successes of European Cities of Culture (EuCoC) such as Liverpool and Glasgow (2017, Boland, Mullan et al. 2018) the UK Government looked to replicate this through a UK organised simulacrum with the hope that the reported benefits of the supranational events would be replicated on a national event evidencing the trend of cultural “neoliberalisation” (McGuigan 2010)where culture is mobilised for alleged economic benefits (Boland, et al., 2018) (DCMS, 2017). The benefits posited included significant economic and social impact (Philip Boland, 2018) (Derry City and Strabane District Council, 2018) and demonstrate the development of a common narrative where culture is used as a tool of economic development (Van der Borg & Russo, 2005) (Cunningham, et al., 2018). This was crystallised in Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s (DCMS) mapping document: “The Creative Industries” (CITF, 1998) under the New Labour government of the time. Although the actual measurable benefits have been branded as “dubious” by some highly sceptical critics of neoliberal cultural regeneration such as Jim McGuigan (2010) and other commentators such as Beatriz Garcia (2004,2005) who also cast doubt on some of the claims made for the potential impacts claimed of City of Culture (CoC).  Some of the impacts promised for Uk City of Culture (UKCoC) were in fact, highly measurable, such as the forecast £100 million of media coverage and £300 million of capital investment (Derry City and Strabane District Council, 2018) and increases in visitors by 563,000 and increases in Hotel occupancy (Derry City and Strabane District Council, 2018) (ILEX, 2014) great promises were also made regarding halting the “brain drain” and in improving retention of young people, although no quantifiable targets were given in UKCoC documents (Derry City Council , 2010) (Derry City Council, 2013a) (Derry City Council, 2013b) (Boland, et al., 2018)

With the object of providing some insight into the direct economic impact of UKCoC, key datasets were identified, and relevant information extracted for analysis.  Sources included Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA, 2017) UK Office for National Statistics (Office for National Statistics, 2020) Derry City and Strabane District Counci (Derry City Council, 2013a) (Derry City and Strabane District Council, 2018)l, ILEX (Derry development Company), Hull City Council (Hull City Council a, 2020) (Hull City Council b, 2020) and Humber LEP (Hull City Council b, 2020) and Centre for Cities (Centre for Cities, 2020).  It should be noted that where possible data has been sourced from organisations external to the UKCoC organisers, who may have a perceived bias to reporting only the positive facts (Hankinson, 2004) (Harvey, 2012).  This research is planned to contribute as part of a dissertation study of the impact, value and opportunity cost of UKCoC and its efficacy as a tool of urban regeneration and place-making.

There is an interesting contrast between the promises made for the UK’s City of Culture  (UKCoC) 2013Derry/Londonderry and those made for Hull’s bid for 2017 where some of the rhetoric – especially regarding measurable economic impact – was scaled down or readjusted to be measured in “soft” impacts rather than “hard“ impacts.  These “soft” impacts are more challenging to measure compared with the the easier to quantify “hard“ impacts such as employment levels  and can include such things as tourist expenditure, improvement in topophilia or reopening of formerly unused buildings for cultural activities and other, more intangible or indirect benefits  (Van der Borg & Russo, 2005). It might be overly cynical to assume a policy of deliberate obfuscation by UKCoC organisers and stakeholders – who were heavily invested in demonstrating UKCoC as a success – however a comparative analysis of the initial bid documents and subsequent post event impact reports by both Derry/Londonderry and Hull UKCoC organisers – ostensibly the local government authorities – show a disconnect between the promised “hard impacts” and the reporting of the actuality which often measures different indices and creates a difficulty for accurate quantifiable data analysis that would allow conclusions to be drawn as to whether the hyperbole was matched by reality – especially in terms of economic impact (Boland, et al., 2016) (Garcia, 2005). This is particularly noticeable in the Derry/Londonderry case where the post event evaluation report claims improvements but often don’t give baselines (Derry City Council , 2010) (Derry City and Strabane District Council, 2018).

One criticism of the seductive rhetoric of of UKCoC and European CoC is the appropriation of successes that are unrelated to the CoC bid (Connolly, 2013) (García, 2004).  The infographic attempts to represent this utilising the specific example of job levels, which were promised to increase through the efforts of Derry/Londonderry UKCoC (Derry City Council , 2010)and Hull UKCoC (Hull UK City of Culture 2017 Ltd, 2015). As shown in the infographic employment rate improved in the Hull NUTS3 area did have a faster rate of improvement c.f. national employment rates.  However the infographic demonstrates the importance of the port sector to employment in the city and that preceding and over the period of Hull UKCoC, Hull had become the base for supporting the world’s largest offshore windfarm with Siemens alone creating 1000 new jobs (Hull City Council a, 2020).This demonstrates the complexity of measuring the any proposed causal relationship for the longer term economic impact of UKCoC  (Liu, 2014) (Li & McCabe, 2012)

The long term legacy of the UKCoC programme was expected to include: culturally led regeneration, youth retention, youth employment, overall employment, inward investment both direct and indirect, increase in tourism, increase in media coverage and in the case of Hull a drop in retail vacancies (Derry City Council, 2013b) (Hull UK City of Culture 2017 Ltd, 2015)

Infographics can be used to explain an object, idea or process using clear illustrations in a way that unlocks the information being provided to give insights and clarity or present data in an interesting format that paints a narrative (Lankow, 2012) The attached infographic aims to present a critical analysis of some of the secondary data sources which represent the recorded impact of UKCoC and which challenge some of the existing narrative from organisers (Arts Council England, 2012) who almost consistently represent UKCoC as a driver for economic growth and job creation.  As such, rather than provide an holistic view of the impact of UKCoC, data sets chosen were those which emphasised the quantifiable impacts, especially, although not exclusively from an economic impact. The infographic exposes dichotomies between the hype and the reality of the impact of UkCoC and invites further analysis of the value proposition of UK CoC and whether it is ‘life and place changing’ or a ‘12 month party’? (Boland, et al., 2016), it further invites research into the opportunity cost of staging events such as UKCoC  as, if the wished for outcomes are – for example – a new cultural venue, more hotels, inward investment and more jobs, the question could be asked as to whether resource should be applied to achieving the outcomes directly rather than indirectly through a proposed and seemingly unproven “economic osmosis”. Indeed the major success in Hull in creating jobs seems unrelated to the CoC initiative but relate to port and wind farm activity (Hull City Council a, 2020) (Hull City Council b, 2020)  These questions become more pertinent as cities around the UK and the wider world face difficult decisions about the future shape of their place as the ongoing decline of traditional retail and the effects of Covid 19 impact the vitality of city centres and traditional uses. The homogenisation effects of assigning resource to, what appear to be, top down imported CoC “roadshows” could in fact act as a dampener on the creation of home grown local talent and the diminishing of indigenous, authentic and potential Foucauldian heterotopic assets within a city, that offer the promise of a more sustainable conduit to coherent communities, wealth and job creation. (Ntounis & Kanellopoulou, 2017)

References

Arts Council England, 2012. Measuring the Economic Benefits of Arts and Culture – practical Guidance on Research methodologies for Arts and Cultural Organisations. London: Arts Council England.

Bianchini, F. & Parkinson, M., 1993. Cultural policy and urban regeneration: the West European experience. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Boland, P. B., Murtagh & Shirlow, P., 2016. Fashioning a City of Culture: ‘Life and Place Changing’ or ‘12 Month Party’?. International Journal of Cultural Policy.

Boland, P., Mullan, L. & Murtagh, B., 2018. Young people in a city of culture: ‘Ultimate beneficiaries’ or ‘Economic migrants’?. Journal of Youth Studies, 21(2), pp. 178-202.

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Cunningham, Isaac & Platt, L. C., 2018. Bidding for UK City of Culture: Challenges of delivering a bottom-up approach ’in place’ for a top-down strategy led scheme. Journal of Place Management and Development, Volume 11.

DCMS, 2017. UK City of Culture 2021: Bidding Guidance, London: Department for Culture, Media and Sport.

Derry City and Strabane District Council, 2018. Post Project Evaluation of City of Culture 2013, Derry City: Derry City and Strabane District Council.

Derry City Council , 2010. Cracking the Code. City of Culture 2013, Derry: Derry City Council .

Derry City Council, 2013a. Our Legacy Promise. Building on the Success of 2013, Derry: Derry City Council.

Derry City Council, 2013b. Legacy Plan 2013–2023, Derry: Derry City Council.

García, B., 2004. Cultural Policy and Urban Regeneration in Western European Cities: Lessons from Experience, Prospects for the Future. Local Economy, Volume 19(4), pp. 312-316.

Garcia, B., 2005. Deconstructing the City of Culture: The Long-term Cultural Legacies of Glasgow 1990. Urban Studie, 42 (5/6)(May), pp. 841-868.

Garcia, B., 2017. ‘‘If everyone says so …’ Press narratives and image change in major event host cities’. Urban Studies, Volume 54(14), p. 3178–3198.

Hankinson, G., 2004. Relational network brands: Towards a conceptual model of place brands. Journal of Vacation Marketing, 10(2), p. 109–121.

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Li, S. & McCabe, S., 2012. Measuring the Socio‐Economic Legacies of Mega‐events: Concepts, Propositions and Indicators. International Journal of Tourism Research, pp. 388-402.

Liu, Y.-D., 2014. Socio-Cultural Impacts of Major Event: Evidence From the 2008 European Capital of Culture, Liverpool. Social Indicators Research, 115(3), pp. 983-998.

McGuigan, J., 2010. Neoliberalism, urban regeneration and cultural policy. In: Cultural analysis. London: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 117-128.

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Ntounis, N. & Kanellopoulou, E., 2017. Normalising jurisdictional heterotopias through place branding: The cases of Christiania and Metelkova. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 49(10), pp. 2223-2240.

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Top Down? Bottom Up? – Theory or Community? The Application of Current Urban Theory and the Role Of Stakeholders in Shaping and Implementation of Successful Place Based Interventions

Featured

SoMAC Art in the City bannersSolutions to Urban problems are often proposed by urban planning professionals based on whatever urban planning theories hold sway at the time.  Often these proposed solutions are generated “top down” by “experts” using an internationalist template of “best practice” with a cursory reference to the communities living within neighbourhoods.  Is there a better, more effective way?

Today it is taken as given by many authorities that in most western liberal societies and certainly within a UK context, modern urban planning should promote diversity, inclusion, complexity and creativity (Baycan-Levent, 2010) (Jacobs, 1961) (Sasaki, 2010) (Florida, 2003).  This is demonstrated by the focus on the social rather than purely functional and economic uses of place by the feminist planners of Cole.Lectiu Punt 6 in Barcelona (Escalante & Ladivia, 2015) (Cole.Lectiu Punt 6, 2019). Urban theory has in parts shown a progression from urban planning framed to develop a distinctly middle-class restorative utopia and blueprint for an ideal society as demonstrated by Ebeneezar Howard’s 1903 treatise “Garden Cities of To-Morrow”  (Tizot, 2018) which postulated an alternative to the overcrowded and polluted industrial cities of the turn of the twentieth century with his solution centred on creating smaller “garden cities” through the now often disparaged view of cities as “machines to live in”  (Le Corbusier, 1946) and Le Corbusier’s “City of Three Million” model (Corbusier, 1929) and subsequent paradigmatic design for “Ville Radieuse” with its geometrically planned for “towers in a park,” produced with no reference to existing neighbourhoods which for more than a generation would influence planners. Reginald Isaacs however rejected earlier definitions of neighbourhood as given by Dahir (1947) pointing out that in modern times people are mobile and therefore can chose to work, spend their money and engage in leisure activities, anywhere in the city and further afield, emphasising that this wide choice and opportunity is the raison d’être for cities (Adams, et al., 1949)

The perceived riposte to the those propounding these physical structure centred theories were influentially voiced by Jane Jacobs, Louis Wirth and others who focussed on the “intricate network of social interrelation” (Wirth, 1938) (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974) (Jacobs, 1961). Others including “Situationist” artists and architects who in the 1950’s aimed to portray the city as it was experienced by its real residents, not necessarily as it was ‘top down’  planned by urban planners and architects (Badger, 2012)

The theoretical concepts behind these different approaches to place development and planning in of themselves posit that solutions to urban problems often require external intervention (Tizot, 2018) (Le Corbusier, 1946) (Dahir, 1947).  Although Jacobs seems to indicate that solutions to urban problems can arise from within the community itself – for example  she comments that crime can be prevented by “kibitzers”, shopkeepers and the community as a whole through having eyes on the street and a personal investment in the prevention and reporting of that crime (Jacobs, 1961).  Commentators such as Richard Florida have focused on how creativity can have a paradoxical nature, both subverting and being used for production of the neo-liberal city (Florida, 2003) some examples of this in modern times include the direct actions through the “protestival” (protest+carnival) (Carmo, 2012) and there is much evidence on the effects communities can have on place and image or perception of place (Florida, 2003). It could argued that the natural conclusion of the community centred interventions postulated by Jacobs (1961) and latterly by Florida (2003) is the Gentrification of a neighbourhood. Some sources would say that this is also the expected and possibly welcome outcome of urban regeneration, but caveat the importance to consider and resist the neglect and marginalization of those people being” socially cleansed” or displaced by that gentrification (Lees, 2018) (Hamnett, 2003) .

One of the many examples of where urban theory has been applied to real world urban problems is in Gloucester UK. Since 2006 with the formation of the Gloucester Heritage Regeneration Company, much emphasis was placed by that organisation and Gloucester City Council on top-down physical regeneration of the city as a solution.  At the historic Gloucester Docks, massive investment from Peel Holdings, the Regional Development Agency and others led to the regeneration of derelict docks transforming the area with a designer outlet and for the area relatively expensive apartments.  This model has been looked on with envy by some stakeholders in other geographic areas of the city, including some of the principals of the businesses in lower Eastgate quarter and their representatives on the board of the Gloucester Business Improvement District and the perceived benefits that public realm improvements could make to an area in reducing crime, improving footfall, improving the ambiance, increasing property values, increasing business and residential occupancy and so-on. In common with several commentators the process of ‘gentrification’ which was first coined by the British urbanist Ruth Glass in 1964 is perceived by those promoting it as being largely beneficial (Lees, 2018) (Steinmetz-Wood, et al., 2017) (Hamnett, 2003)

Examining in detail the Lower Eastgate area in Gloucester (United Kingdom) that has been identified as needing intervention by businesses in the area and by residents provides an interesting model to critically evaluate the relevance of urban theory when applied in a real world situation and provides lessons for other urban areas.  The Lower Eastgate area is an area of high deprivation in the Barton and Tredworth Ward of Gloucester, one of the poorest in the United Kingdom with a reported 43% of children in poverty (Gloucestershire Live, 2018) it has a high level of ethnic and cultural diversity with 41.4% of the population from non-white ethnic groups, and nearly one quarter identifying themselves as Muslim, one quarter as Sikh and nearly half identifying themselves as Christian (Brinkhoff, 2018).  Lower Eastgate Street forms part of the historic core of Gloucester City, it has an eclectic mix of different uses and includes cultural and architectural heritage that combine to characterise the street including nightclubs, a theatre, take-away and sit in restaurants and independent businesses alongside residential. Gloucester City Council’s Public Realm Strategy categorises Lower Eastgate Street as a secondary street which surrounds the historic gate streets and lanes and forms the outer layer of public realm within the City Centre, having an important strategic and functional role. There have been hopes expressed by the Gloucester Business Improvement District (Gloucester BID) to create an “Urban Village” (Pollard, 2004) similar to the aspirations for Birmingham’s Jewellery Quarter, which in itself raises some questions about the ultimate benefits to current residents and local business owners which were highlighted by Jane Jacobs and others and as a critical failing leaves unanswered how broader urban regeneration strategies, will affect existing material and social networks, and the potential for “undemocratic, exclusionary geographies being produced through such regeneration schemes” (Pollard, 2004)

An important problem for Lower Eastgate and its environs are perceptions by residents and visitors that crime and anti-social behaviour are at high incidence within the neighbourhood, evidence of crimes reported indicates that initially these perceptions are in some part grounded in fact – during October 2019, 139 crimes were reported in the area with a much lower number of 36 crimes being reported in the the area that reported the second highest number of incidents, however the devil is in the detail as further investigation demonstrates that only 38 of the reported crimes actually took place on Lower Eastgate Street and immediate neighbourhood The remaining crimes related mostly to shoplifting offences that took place in the proximate city centre shopping area (Police UK, 2019) There is also a difference in the class of offences being reported with a higher proportion of antisocial behaviour and violence and sexual offences being reported in the Lower Eastgate immediate area. Conversations with Police officers indicate a direct correlation between this mix of incidents and the concentration of night time and late night economy businesses within Eastgate Street.  As has been commented upon for city districts to be successful it is essential that residents and visitors must   have the perception of assured personal safety and security (Jacobs, 1961) – people can choose to go where they like for goods and services (Isaacs, 1949) and are unlikely to go to areas which are perceived as un-safe or unattractive.  Gloucester City Council and stakeholder groups including the the Gloucester licensed Victuallers Association, Gloucester BID, and The Evening Economy Group, have put much effort into changing perceptions of of the safety and security of the area including working to achieve the Association of Town and City management “Purple Flag” status (Gloucestershire Live, 2018) (ATCM, 2019)
The “Broken Windows” model posited by Wilson and Kelling (1982) proposes there can be a process where neighbourhoods decline into areas of high crime through a developmental sequence of disorderly conditions, wherein “social incivilities”  –  street drinking, antisocial behaviour, and “physical incivilities” for example abandoned buildings and disused  plots, fly-tipping and trash on the streets and so-forth incites fear amongst local residents and visitors. With a growing fear of crime those families that have the means leave the area, and remaining residents develop behaviours where they separate and quarantine themselves from the community.  This leads to a cycle where the lack of control and observation leads to an escalation as anonymity increases, attracting more potential offenders to an area, more antisocial behaviour and increases in serious criminal behaviour. Wilson and Kelling (1982) argued that serious crime developed because the police and citizens did not collaborate to prevent urban decay and social disorder, they used the metaphor that ”a broken window left unrepaired will soon lead to the breaking of all other windows in a building”. Philip Zimbardo’s field experiments with abandoned cars gave some authority to this view indicating that vandalism and more serious crimes can occur anywhere where the jell of civility and mutual regard had been eroded (Zimbardo, 1973). Wilson and Kelling (1982) further contended that serious crime would develop because the police and citizens did not work together to prevent urban decay and social disorder.  Jane Jacobs had a slightly different view arguing that the “public peace” is kept and enforced by the community itself, based on a complex web of voluntary standards and often unwritten rules for behaviour and the police were a secondary influence.  Her discussion of this effect in North End, Boston demonstrated that the resident “kibitzers” (by Jacob’s definition the engaged spectators in a community)  and shopkeepers prevented a high number crimes through their intervention (Jacobs, 1961) this provides a sharp contrast to the examples described by Wilson and Kelling (1982) which were characterized by a lack of topophilia, increasing isolation and anonymity which lead to an increase in crime.

Replicating what is considered to be a successful model developed elsewhere in the city of Gloucester the proposed intervention for Lower Eastgate Street follows current urban theory and practice using a socio-spatial process (Moor, et al., 2006) (Gehl, 1971) (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) and by investing in transforming the public realm and the built environment to develop a pleasanter, more attractive neighbourhood and act as a spur for further regeneration.  Funding for this would in part come from the Gloucester BID, Gloucester City Council and Highways Agency through Gloucestershire County Council. Key to this intervention should be following the clarion cry of Jan Gehl (1971) “Life, Spaces, Buildings – and in that order please” and the principles outlined by Jacobs (1961) and other commentators where the understanding and importance of human behaviour is classed as equally important as the understanding of urban elements including public realm, built environment and transport systems (Gehl & Svarre, 2013).  In line with the theory previously outlined it is proposed that this intervention will help create an area perceived to be safer from crime, safer for pedestrians, create an environment that will build civic pride and encourage inward investment (Collins, 2016).  The example of Kimbrose Triangle and other areas in Gloucester where similar interventions are credited with having the same effects has been seized upon by local business owners as proof that this will work in Lower Eastgate Street, other examples globally also support this (Furlan, et al., 2019 ) (Moor, et al., 2006)

Currently Lower Eastgate Street is dominated by its wide road, carrying two-way traffic and providing bays for a large number of buses and on street parking. There are a number of derelict buildings, and currently no trees or green spaces.

Specific proposed interventions aim to improve the character and quality of the street and encourage pride in place by creating a pedestrian focused and vibrant streetscape that relates primarily to current uses by residents and visitors and has the potential to drive footfall from the city centre and attract inward investment by strengthening pedestrian connections between Lower Eastgate Street and Eastgate Street as well as improving the connections to the primary streets and activity hotspots. It is proposed to reduce the carriageway to four metres, providing wider pedestrian footways to accommodate street trees, furniture and create social spaces and café culture which will promote healthy communities and to achieve high levels of safety and amenity through developing a vibrant community in an environment that is conducive to putting eyes on the street and help to conserve and enhance the historic environment and strengthen the night time economy along the street. Integrating existing parking and bus stops along the street would ensure that the street’s economy and activities are serviced, replicating the current short term parking, drop in/drop off nature of commercial and community activities in the street such as take-away restaurants, nursery, health centre, nail bars and so-on.

On balance notwithstanding some risks, highlighted later, the proposed intervention is one that has much to recommend itself.  The main criticism about the approach outlined above is that the solutions proposed are based on an “expert generated” physical regeneration as a panacea for all urban problems facing areas such as Lower Eastgate Street. Experience has shown the dichotomy between  the livability discourse promulgating a representation for some cities that is in stark contrast to the experience of residents (McArthur & Robin, 2019). While proposals for urban regeneration often talk grandly about the importance of community engagement as shown in the England (UK) regeneration scheme, the 1998–2010 New Deal for Communities programme (Lawless & Pearson, 2012) (Bailey, 2010), they are often light on proposing any social or community initiatives, or engagement by voluntary or public sector to shape the solutions to the issues facing the area such as crime, antisocial behaviour, drugs, prostitution and run down built environment – there often appears to be little effort to genuinely involve the community as a whole from an early stage. The literature recognises that wider stakeholder engagement gives better potential to achieve plan for redevelopment which could garner consensus  and has the potential to mitigate resistance from communities often associated with ‘top down’ urban planning (Newton & Glackin, 2013) (Ball, 2004)

This lack of “ownership” by residents could lead to solutions that are inauthentic to the communities of the area and not fit for purpose for the needs of the community.  The concept of bringing a pocket park has much to recommend itself in general urban theory and practice (Lee & Kim, 2015) however the same empirical evidence indicates that where there is no buy in to development of this type of space and where its establishment is not community led – and potentially “policed” under the “kibitzer” model highlighted by Jacobs (1961) there is a danger of the public space not being adopted by the majority of residents instead becoming a haunt of anti-social behaviour.  A similar pocket park initiative to that proposed was developed in Gloucester’s Conduit street as a “bright idea” from urban planners and within a few years had been closed to use as those engaged in street drinking and antisocial behaviour drove away the families using the space.  Often little commentary is given as to the long term funding for maintenance and policing for such areas and this creates real concern for sustainability (Eichler, 2019) and the potential is evidentially there that areas such as pocket parks can actually reverse urban improvement.

The litmus test for the physical regeneration model highlighted above would be whether it will actually work to reduce crime – or the perception of crime which is almost as important, whether it will genuinely increase footfall and vibrancy in Lower Eastgate, whether the proposed top-down development of a public “pocket park” will actually become a pleasant place for families to use or a haunt for street drinkers and whether the prioritisation of the pedestrian will benefit or be detrimental to local businesses which might rely on cars for their trade, and whether as a whole this intervention will encourage further inward investment.  There is also the ever-present two-edged sword of gentrification with its potential concomitant challenges of exclusionary geographies and influx of spatial capital (Rérat & Lees, 2011). Concerns have been expressed in the local press about the effects of gentrification on rising house prices and rents and the displacement of lower-income families and smaller independent businesses (Gloucestershire Live, 2019). Without the genuine buy-in of the local community there is a potential that authentic locally based initiatives will be lost as regeneration is done “to” the community rather than “by” or with the community and its holistic stakeholder base – the antidote to this is for those involved in urban planning to look at community-centric models such as proposed feminist planners of Cole.Lectiu Punt 6 in Barcelona (Escalante & Ladivia, 2015) (Cole.Lectiu Punt 6, 2019) and repeat as a mantra the directions of Jan Gehl (1971) “Life, Spaces, Buildings – and in that order please”

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